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Antitrust

Jonathan Lee: Antitrust Division’s Flawed Case Against AT&T/Time Warner is Simply Too General

Broadband Breakfast Staff

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Telecom attorney Jonathan Lee takes down the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s specious case against the AT&T/Time Warner merger in this detailed blog post, excerpted below. (Click on the link at the bottom for the whole argument.) Here’s the money quote: “This alleged harm is simply too general to merit analysis.”

Assumptions On Assumptions: The DoJ’s Fatally Weak AT&T/TWX Complaint, by Jonathan Lee at TelecoComSense.com:

The DoJ notes three kinds of video distributors: 1) traditional multi-channel video programming distributors (“MVPDs”), like cable, legacy phone, and satellite providers; 2) virtual MVPDs (“VMVPDs”), which are similar to MVPDs, but offered over the internet, and available nationally; and 3) subscription video on demand services (“SVODs”), like Amazon Prime and Netflix, who offer video on demand programming nationally, but do not offer live programming like news and sports. Complaint, paras 15-19.

Based on these definitions, the Government asserts that  two relevant product markets exist: 1) the “All Video Distribution” market, which comprises all types of video distributors (MVPD, virtual MVPD, and SVOD), and 2) the “Multichannel Video Distribution” market, which includes MVPDs and virtual MVPDs (hereinafter, “MVPDs”).  The relevant geographic markets, the DoJ argues, are local Designated Market Areas, which are defined by choices of supplier available to consumers (the wireline service providers of Multichannel Video Distribution vary according to their individual network coverage areas).  Complaint, paras 27-30.

Competitive Effects

The DoJ contends that the merger will harm competition/raise prices in both the All Video Distribution and Multichannel Video Distribution markets throughout the country because it would give the post-merger firm the ability to unilaterally raise the price of wholesale programming (from Turner Broadcasting & HBO) to rival MVPDs.  The enhanced ability to raise prices to rivals is the DoJ’s primary argument.

But, almost like the perfunctory “and stuff” ending that teenagers tack on to woefully incomplete answers, the DoJ also claims that the merger will “give the merged company the ability to impede and slow innovation by hindering emerging online competitors and would increase the likelihood of oligopolistic coordination.” Complaint, paras. 31-41, generally; quote from Subsection V.B.  I quote the Complaint directly so that readers can see that this alleged harm is simply too general to merit analysis. The Government’s main point, though, is not a huge improvement.

[more…]

Source: Assumptions On Assumptions: The DoJ’s Fatally Weak AT&T/TWX Complaint – TeleComSense

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Antitrust

Lawmakers And Newsmakers Tackle Google and Facebook Market Power

Sen. Klobuchar, Rep. Cicilline and experts discuss antitrust, big tech and local journalism.

Tim White

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on

Screenshot of Amy Klobuchar taken from Open Markets Institute event

Telecom attorney Jonathan Lee takes down the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s specious case against the AT&T/Time Warner merger in this detailed blog post, excerpted below. (Click on the link at the bottom for the whole argument.) Here’s the money quote: “This alleged harm is simply too general to merit analysis.”

Assumptions On Assumptions: The DoJ’s Fatally Weak AT&T/TWX Complaint, by Jonathan Lee at TelecoComSense.com:

The DoJ notes three kinds of video distributors: 1) traditional multi-channel video programming distributors (“MVPDs”), like cable, legacy phone, and satellite providers; 2) virtual MVPDs (“VMVPDs”), which are similar to MVPDs, but offered over the internet, and available nationally; and 3) subscription video on demand services (“SVODs”), like Amazon Prime and Netflix, who offer video on demand programming nationally, but do not offer live programming like news and sports. Complaint, paras 15-19.

Based on these definitions, the Government asserts that  two relevant product markets exist: 1) the “All Video Distribution” market, which comprises all types of video distributors (MVPD, virtual MVPD, and SVOD), and 2) the “Multichannel Video Distribution” market, which includes MVPDs and virtual MVPDs (hereinafter, “MVPDs”).  The relevant geographic markets, the DoJ argues, are local Designated Market Areas, which are defined by choices of supplier available to consumers (the wireline service providers of Multichannel Video Distribution vary according to their individual network coverage areas).  Complaint, paras 27-30.

Competitive Effects

The DoJ contends that the merger will harm competition/raise prices in both the All Video Distribution and Multichannel Video Distribution markets throughout the country because it would give the post-merger firm the ability to unilaterally raise the price of wholesale programming (from Turner Broadcasting & HBO) to rival MVPDs.  The enhanced ability to raise prices to rivals is the DoJ’s primary argument.

But, almost like the perfunctory “and stuff” ending that teenagers tack on to woefully incomplete answers, the DoJ also claims that the merger will “give the merged company the ability to impede and slow innovation by hindering emerging online competitors and would increase the likelihood of oligopolistic coordination.” Complaint, paras. 31-41, generally; quote from Subsection V.B.  I quote the Complaint directly so that readers can see that this alleged harm is simply too general to merit analysis. The Government’s main point, though, is not a huge improvement.

[more…]

Source: Assumptions On Assumptions: The DoJ’s Fatally Weak AT&T/TWX Complaint – TeleComSense

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Antitrust

Former and Current FTC Commissioners Laud Efforts At Greater Resources For Antitrust Cases

Samuel Triginelli

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Screenshot of FTC Commissioner Noah Philips on C-SPAN in November 2018

Telecom attorney Jonathan Lee takes down the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s specious case against the AT&T/Time Warner merger in this detailed blog post, excerpted below. (Click on the link at the bottom for the whole argument.) Here’s the money quote: “This alleged harm is simply too general to merit analysis.”

Assumptions On Assumptions: The DoJ’s Fatally Weak AT&T/TWX Complaint, by Jonathan Lee at TelecoComSense.com:

The DoJ notes three kinds of video distributors: 1) traditional multi-channel video programming distributors (“MVPDs”), like cable, legacy phone, and satellite providers; 2) virtual MVPDs (“VMVPDs”), which are similar to MVPDs, but offered over the internet, and available nationally; and 3) subscription video on demand services (“SVODs”), like Amazon Prime and Netflix, who offer video on demand programming nationally, but do not offer live programming like news and sports. Complaint, paras 15-19.

Based on these definitions, the Government asserts that  two relevant product markets exist: 1) the “All Video Distribution” market, which comprises all types of video distributors (MVPD, virtual MVPD, and SVOD), and 2) the “Multichannel Video Distribution” market, which includes MVPDs and virtual MVPDs (hereinafter, “MVPDs”).  The relevant geographic markets, the DoJ argues, are local Designated Market Areas, which are defined by choices of supplier available to consumers (the wireline service providers of Multichannel Video Distribution vary according to their individual network coverage areas).  Complaint, paras 27-30.

Competitive Effects

The DoJ contends that the merger will harm competition/raise prices in both the All Video Distribution and Multichannel Video Distribution markets throughout the country because it would give the post-merger firm the ability to unilaterally raise the price of wholesale programming (from Turner Broadcasting & HBO) to rival MVPDs.  The enhanced ability to raise prices to rivals is the DoJ’s primary argument.

But, almost like the perfunctory “and stuff” ending that teenagers tack on to woefully incomplete answers, the DoJ also claims that the merger will “give the merged company the ability to impede and slow innovation by hindering emerging online competitors and would increase the likelihood of oligopolistic coordination.” Complaint, paras. 31-41, generally; quote from Subsection V.B.  I quote the Complaint directly so that readers can see that this alleged harm is simply too general to merit analysis. The Government’s main point, though, is not a huge improvement.

[more…]

Source: Assumptions On Assumptions: The DoJ’s Fatally Weak AT&T/TWX Complaint – TeleComSense

Continue Reading

Antitrust

House Committee Hears of Big Tech’s Alleged Anticompetitive Behavior in New Hearing

Samuel Triginelli

Published

on

Photo of House Antitrust Subcommittee Chairman David Cicilline at the Thursday hearing

Telecom attorney Jonathan Lee takes down the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s specious case against the AT&T/Time Warner merger in this detailed blog post, excerpted below. (Click on the link at the bottom for the whole argument.) Here’s the money quote: “This alleged harm is simply too general to merit analysis.”

Assumptions On Assumptions: The DoJ’s Fatally Weak AT&T/TWX Complaint, by Jonathan Lee at TelecoComSense.com:

The DoJ notes three kinds of video distributors: 1) traditional multi-channel video programming distributors (“MVPDs”), like cable, legacy phone, and satellite providers; 2) virtual MVPDs (“VMVPDs”), which are similar to MVPDs, but offered over the internet, and available nationally; and 3) subscription video on demand services (“SVODs”), like Amazon Prime and Netflix, who offer video on demand programming nationally, but do not offer live programming like news and sports. Complaint, paras 15-19.

Based on these definitions, the Government asserts that  two relevant product markets exist: 1) the “All Video Distribution” market, which comprises all types of video distributors (MVPD, virtual MVPD, and SVOD), and 2) the “Multichannel Video Distribution” market, which includes MVPDs and virtual MVPDs (hereinafter, “MVPDs”).  The relevant geographic markets, the DoJ argues, are local Designated Market Areas, which are defined by choices of supplier available to consumers (the wireline service providers of Multichannel Video Distribution vary according to their individual network coverage areas).  Complaint, paras 27-30.

Competitive Effects

The DoJ contends that the merger will harm competition/raise prices in both the All Video Distribution and Multichannel Video Distribution markets throughout the country because it would give the post-merger firm the ability to unilaterally raise the price of wholesale programming (from Turner Broadcasting & HBO) to rival MVPDs.  The enhanced ability to raise prices to rivals is the DoJ’s primary argument.

But, almost like the perfunctory “and stuff” ending that teenagers tack on to woefully incomplete answers, the DoJ also claims that the merger will “give the merged company the ability to impede and slow innovation by hindering emerging online competitors and would increase the likelihood of oligopolistic coordination.” Complaint, paras. 31-41, generally; quote from Subsection V.B.  I quote the Complaint directly so that readers can see that this alleged harm is simply too general to merit analysis. The Government’s main point, though, is not a huge improvement.

[more…]

Source: Assumptions On Assumptions: The DoJ’s Fatally Weak AT&T/TWX Complaint – TeleComSense

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