Dean Bubley: Key Lessons from Hong Kong’s 6 GHz Spectrum Auction

As American policymakers continue to debate the future of the 6 GigaHertz (GHz) wireless spectrum band, they would do well to study the lessons Hong Kong learned in launching the world's first auction of 6 GHz mobile licenses in November 2024. That auction’s sobering results – marked by low demand, tepid participation from cellular carriers, and disappointing final bidding totals – should temper policymakers’ hopes for the band’s potential to deliver significant government revenues and anchor public 5G and future 6G networks for decades to come.

While this auction was an effort early in the 6 GHz cycle, and was viewed by many as exploratory to test demand, there was little sign that mobile carriers view the band, as some have claimed, as “future beachfront property”. 

Hong Kong’s regulator, the Office of the Communications Authority (OFCA), had offered 400 megahertz of spectrum in the upper part of the 6 GHz band – but only 300 megahertz was sold, raising only around $81 million (HK$630 million) – only marginally above the reserve price. Three incumbent carriers each obtained 100 megahertz, with China Mobile Hong Kong, Hong Kong Telecommunications (HKT), and SmarTone paying an identical HK$210 million in fees. The fourth existing operator, Hutchison Telephone Company, chose not to participate despite being a qualified bidder, and no new entrants saw this as an opportunity either.

Background to Hong Kong's 6 GHz spectrum auction

The cellular industry has long expected 5G to use only low/mid-bands below 6 GHz or above 24 GHz (usually called mmWave). 

But after the U.S. Wi-Fi industry successfully obtained access to the 5925-7125 MHz range in 2020 and other countries’ regulators started following suit, the mobile industry also started to express an interest in the range, especially in China. 

At the World Radiocommunication Conference at the end of 2023 (WRC-23), regulators and stakeholders fiercely debated the upper 6 GHz band. In much of Asia, only the top 100 megahertz between 7025–7125 MHz was eventually identified for mobile cellular use, while in Europe the whole upper section was notionally identified, but with the caveat that Wi-Fi should also have access to it. 

There are also existing users in that band in many countries, including microwave connections (often for mobile backhaul or critical infrastructure like utility grids), plus some satellite uplink sites. These must either be relocated, or accomadated through some sort of coexistence or sharing model, if it is to be used for full-power mobile networks.

Collectively, this has resulted in a global patchwork of regulatory approaches, with ongoing work on trialing new hybrid and sharing mechanisms, while others have pushed ahead with unlicensed models at varying power levels. This is complicating device and network harmonization. There will likely be continued differences – especially given the geopolitics of wireless and the regional leverage of some key market participants.

Possible reasons for its mediocre results

The HK 6 GHz auction outcome yielded just a tenth of the value per MHz compared to the territory’s recent 2.3 GHz sale, which raised HK$1.87 billion for 90 megahertz.

Statements from the operators involved, and the broader industry, point to multiple explanations for the lackluster outcome. These include:

• Timing: The early and unproven market for 6 GHz 5G meant that the ecosystem of network equipment and devices was almost entirely non-existent. Operators faced a significant risk of an “orphaned” spectrum band, or at the very least several years before they could exploit it commercially.
• Restricted use-cases: At present, the market mostly envisages 6 GHz 5G as suitable for localized hotspots such as the busiest urban cores, specific locations such as shopping malls and sports venues, or enterprise private networks. Acquiring national licenses just for isolated hotspots is not attractive either for the MNOs, nor for vendors hoping for large territory-wide infrastructure contracts.
• Topography and construction: Hong Kong is a mix of dense urban cores with many skyscrapers and modern apartment blocks, plus mountainous, subtropical islands. Neither is ideal for propagation of a mid-high frequency band. The prevalence of insulated (coated) glass and reinforced concrete inhibits outdoor-to-indoor signals, while the landscape and foliage limits line-of-sight in outlying areas.
• Alternative options: While existing mobile networks are potentially congested in specific areas, various other options for MNOs exist, such as mmWave, enhanced indoor distributed antenna/radio systems, and Wi-Fi offload. 
• License conditions: The auction design included a 15-year term for licenses, plus obligations for network rollout covering at least 50% of Hong Kong's population within five years of assignment. Given that many of HK’s residential areas are not co-located with the business downtown core zones, that implies infrastructure in zones that may not be economically viable. 

All that said, there were some signs that OFCA’s approach was cautious and reasonable given the band constraints, most of which were known in advance. It only auctioned part of the band, and the 5-year coverage terms offered a chance to claw back spectrum and potentially re-purpose it for unlicensed or local-licensed / shared use at a later date. In other words, it reflected OFCA’s desire for MNO experimentation at low risk, with the presumption that lessons learned could be translated to mainland China and elsewhere. 

How does this translate to demand for upper 6 GHz elsewhere? 

Various other countries are also now starting to examine options for 6 GHz auctions, but there is a general lack of urgency – and an awareness of the challenges highlighted by Hong Kong’s experience. In particular, India and France are now officially consulting on options for the band, while Brazil and some other Asian and Gulf states have mentioned it as future option. Conspicuously however, mainland China has done or said little about the band during 2025. 

Some commentators in the U.S. had also suggested parts of the unlicensed 6 GHz could be reclaimed and auctioned under the FCC’s mandate from the budget reconciliation bill. But this is now considered unlikely, with the White House’s representatives seeming to rule it out recently. Other regions would likely have similar use-cases and demand patterns, albeit sometimes without HK’s extremely high urban densities. Most would probably look at deployments in stadiums, malls, transport hubs, and central business district streets and public spaces. Wide-area coverage is unlikely because it would require extra “densification” – more cell sites. 

However, many of the difficulties and limitations referenced above also apply elsewhere. In particular, in many countries the 6 GHz band is already used for point-to-point microwave connections for applications such as utilities and mobile backhaul, or satellite applications. Some have non-5G fixed wireless access services using it. This makes spectrum clearing and coordination a non-trivial, costly exercise.

Furthermore, any auctions or direct awards of the 6 GHz band for mobile use in other countries will also be dependent on support in end-user devices, especially smartphones and fixed wireless access customer premises modems and gateways. That in turn needs full harmonization and standardization of bands in global 3GPP standards, with a suitable supply-chain for radio components. 

From a valuation perspective, there are numerous discount factors that must be considered. If suitable 6 GHz-capable 5G devices only appear in meaningful numbers by 2028–2029, any revenue benefits for operators are pushed out into the future. Similarly, if deployments are limited to specific hot-zones, the potential revenue uplift or improvement in customer perception is concentrated in a few metros or venues. Unless incumbent users can be rapidly relocated to alternative spectrum, there could well be additional cost items around planning for coexistence, alongside interference coordination or protection. 

Lastly, there is an opportunity cost factor here – the same capital could be used for densification of other midband spectrum assets, deployment of indoor coverage solutions, or perhaps additional compute to support AI-based optimisation of radio networks.

Conclusion

The 2024 Hong Kong 6 GHz auction brought some clarity to one of the most vitriolic and controversial spectrum management problems. It demonstrated that having a supply of spectrum to auction is not sufficient – there also needs to be careful attention paid to the demand side, and especially real-world deployment constraints. 

MNOs have shown that they might take a certain amount of extra 6 GHz spectrum at a suitable (i.e., very low and ideally usage-based) price – but there’s certainly no gold-rush mentality as there has been for the 2-4 GHz spectrum. There is also no obvious sign of early “6G-readiness” hype or a “Fear of Missing Out” (FOMO). 

There is also growing awareness of the “localization” effect of higher frequency bands, with demand constrained to specific venues or highly trafficked outdoor locations. Positioning for national deployments – and especially licensing rules with wide-area coverage targets – are likely to dissuade bidders.

This is a notable contrast with the rapid adoption of unlicensed 6 GHz spectrum among the Wi-Fi sector, both in terms of equipment and interest from enterprise and consumer broadband ISPs. There are already hundreds of millions of devices using the lower part of the band, and in markets such as the U.S. and South Korea, the upper band as well. There is even growing pressure on the Chinese regulator from local IT vendors to change its stance, and for the lower 6 GHz band to be made unlicensed in China too. This is a clear proof-point – and stands in contrast to the questions surrounding cellular use.

In summary, there still appears to be limited appetite for 5G usage of the 6 GHz band in the near term. While there is still vague interest in longer-term usage when devices – or perhaps 6G – become available, this is unlikely to be reflected in auction fees. Regulators should lean towards expansion of unlicensed or low-power/localized use, rather than expect windfalls from national, high-power exclusive licensing – and the cost and inconvenience of clearing incumbent users.

Dean Bubbly is the Founder of Disruptive Analysis. He is one of the leading analysts covering 5G, 6G, Wi-Fi, telco business models & regulation, the future of voice/video, and the emergence of technologies such as quantum networking and AI. This Expert Opinion is exclusive to Broadband Breakfast.

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